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Borkenhagen: Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co. and Its Effects

MONTROSE CHEMICAL CORP. V. ADMIRAL INSURANCE Co.
AND ITS EFFECTS ON CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION

In July of 1995, the Supreme Court of California handed down a decision
which will have a significant effect on construction defect litigation. In
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,' the court held that in
cases of continuous or progressively deteriorating bodily injury or property
damage,2 all commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies in effect
during the period of the injury have potential liability. Therefore, the
insurance companies have the duty to defend.4
California courts have long been divided regarding the insurance issues

discussed in Montrose.5

While Montrose left many related questions

unanswered, it did give the final word on two points. First, Montrose decided

when the potential for liability begins in cases of continuous injury.6
Second, based on its interpretation of the loss-in-progress rule, Montrose
decided when the potential for liability ends.7
While the issue of continuous or progressively deteriorating injury may

arise in a variety of contexts, this Note will focus on Montrose's effects on
construction defect litigation, which has exploded in California in the past
decade.' Part I discusses the development of construction defect law and the

1. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1995).
2. Continuous or progressively deteriorating injury is injury or damage which continues over
a period of time, such as asbestos related disease, shifting soils, or toxic contamination from
buried chemicals. This is in contrast to an injury which is sudden or of short duration, such as
a hail storm or car accident.
3. Commercial General Liability insurance is third party insurance which protects the insured
against potential tort liability to others. Prior to 1985, this type of insurance was known as a
"comprehensive general liability" policy, but the name change did not affect the policy's
coverage. Eugene R. Anderson & Catherine A. Plunkett, Trigger of Coverage:A Policyholder's
Perspective, 1994 INS. LrIG. REP. 252, 253 n.6. Basic CGL insurance provides broad coverage
for bodily injury or property damage which the policyholder becomes legally obligated to pay
as damages, unless specifically excluded. CGL insurance usually provides indemnification for
investigation and defense costs, as well as for liability. Id. at 253.
4. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 3.
5. See California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 467 (Ct. App.
1983) ("It is difficult if not downright impossible, to reconcile the foregoing authorities").
6. Nationwide, a majority of the states have already adopted the continuous injury trigger
which California finally adopted in Montrose. Anderson & Plunkett, supra note 3, at 264. See
also Appellant's Answer Brief at 24 n.4, Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d
1 (Cal. 1995) (lists cases in Florida, Colorado, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Michigan, New
Jersey, Ohio, Texas, Minnesota, Washington, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland).
7. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 29.
8. Construction defect litigation is a thriving industry in California. The California
homebuilding industry is currently pursuing legislative reform in which it seeks to stem the tide
of what it believes is an abusive system. Among the changes being contemplated by the
California State Legislature are: (1) statutorily defining what a "construction defect" is, A.B. Res.
2952, 1996 Leg Sess; (2) shortening the statute of limitations, A.B. Res. 2077, 1996 Leg. Sess.;
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role of insurance in the system. Part II provides background information for
the main insurance issues raised in Montrose, including a discussion of how
the courts decided these matters prior to Montrose. Part II introduces the
facts of Montrose, and analyzes the Court's reasoning.
Montrose raises a number of questions which must be addressed by the
courts before the ruling can translate into a clear and workable system by
which continuous injury insurance disputes can be resolved. Part IV

discusses those problems, and proposes some solutions.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LAW AND THE ROLE OF
INSURANCE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM

Construction defect litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon. Until
approximately thirty-five years ago, buyers of real property in California had

no protection under the law for defectively built housing.9 Previously, the
rule was caveat emptor, or let the buyer beware."' Today there are numerous common law causes of action which can be asserted in a construction
defect claim. These include strict liability, negligence, and breach of express
and implied warranties.
The rise in the number of construction defect actions in the courts is only
partly due to availability of legal recourse. Another significant factor is the
number of residences which are part of a condominium, planned develop-

ment, or other common interest communities." The homeowner's associations which govern these entities bring together large numbers of home
owners with a common interest and a common pocketbook." While it
would often be prohibitively expensive for a single owner to bring a
construction defect action against a developer, once a few dozen, or a few
hundred are joined, the costs become more manageable. Although the costs
of litigation are high, the settlements or judgments often make a suit
worthwhile; they are typically in the millions of dollars due to the high costs

of repairing and replacing defective construction. 3

(3) limiting attorney's contingency fees, A.B. Res. 3281, 1996 Leg. Sess; (4) holding the
homeowner and builder harmless from changes in the building codes following the issuance of
the original building permit, A.B. Res. 2552, 1996 Leg. Sess.; (5) mandating arbitration of the
disputes, A.B. Res 3009, 1996 Leg. Sess.; (6) reducing the liability of Homeowners Association
directors so that they will not feel compelled to initiate suits, A.B. Res. 1317, 1996 Leg. Sess.;
S.B. Res. 1711, 1996 Leg. Sess.
9. THOMAS E. MILLER, CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION DEFECT LITIGATION, RESIDENTIAL AND
COMMERCIAL § 4.1 (2d ed. 1993).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 1.2. See also Caty Van Housen, Life Among the Ruins, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIM.,
June 19, 1994, at HI (stating that "[a]ttorneys, insurance brokers, builders and property managers
questioned for this article say the likelihood that a condo project will be involved in construction
defect litigation is nearly 100 percent").
12. Interview with Alan Johnston, Partner, Duke, Gerstel, Shearer & Bregante, in San
Diego, Cal. (Sept. 1995).
13. MILLER, supranote 9, § 1.2.
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Like homeowners, few developers, builders, or subcontractors could
afford the considerable cost of litigation and repairs on their own. 4 Often,
a plaintiffs only hope of recovery is the defendant's liability insurance."
Because a judgment is usually collected from an insurance company, it is
essential that counsel representing either side of a construction defect claim
be familiar with insurance law.
The doctrine of strict liability was developed hand in hand with the idea
that the manufacturer of a product would not bear the full cost of liability but
would spread it through society by purchasing insurance.' 6 Over the years,
the courts have continued to expand the strict liability doctrine based on the
expectation that the businesses thus exposed would and should purchase
insurance. 17
The Montrose court's opinion can be interpreted as an extension of this
public policy. Montrose suggests that liability costs should be distributed not
only through society, but also throughout the insurance community itself by
spreading liability between a number of different policies.

II. BACKGROUND OF INSURANCE ISSUES DISCUSSED IN MONTROSE
A. Firstand Third Party Policies
The distinction between first and third party policies is the threshold issue
in Montrose.I" First party property damage insurance is the type with which
most people are familiar. An example of this is a homeowner's policy, where
the homeowner is insured against injuries which happen to his person or
property. 9 Third party liability insurance insures against injuries caused to
others.2" This is typical in construction defect litigation where a homeowners association files a claim against a developer or a contractor for damage

14. Id. § 6.1.
15. Id.
16. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a),
cmts. a, b, and c ("The burden of loss caused by defective products should be bourne by those
responsible for marketing of the product and should be treated as a cost of production against
which liability insurance could be obtained.").
17. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (In balancing a number of
items in order to determine whether liability should be extended, the court lists "the availability,
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.").
18. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1995) ("To properly
analyze the trigger of coverage issues presented in this case, it is necessary to first clearly
distinguish between third party liability insurance ... and coverage under a first party property
.
insurance policy .
19. Id.
20. Id.
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allegedly caused to the property. In this case, it is the developer's or con-

tractor's insurance which must indemnify the homeowner.2 '

The California Supreme Court stressed the importance of making a
distinction between first and third party policies in Garvey v. State FarmFire
& Casualty Co. 22 In Garvey, the court differentiated between first and third
party policies with regard to the type of injury insured against. 23 Garvey

also examined the public policy considerations in a concurring opinion.24
The next year, in Prudential-LMICommercialInsurance v. Superior Court,
the court found that differences between first and third party policies would
also affect the analysis of the appropriate trigger of coverage.

In the past ten years, the courts have disagreed on this issue. A number
have declined to ,make a distinction between the two types of policies,26
while others have found the differences dispositive.27 This issue has finally
been addressed and resolved in Montrose.2"
B. Duty to Defend
Once a defendant becomes aware that a third party claim is being

threatened or filed against him, he must inform his insurance carriers, so that
they may tender a defense.29 The insurer's duty to defend is broader than

21. MILLER, supra note 9, § 6.3.
22. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1989).
23. Id. at 710. "[Ihe right to coverage in the third party liability insurance context draws
on traditional tort concepts of fault, proximate cause and duty. This liability analysis differs
substantially from the coverage analysis in the property insurance context, which draws on the
relationship between perils that are either covered or excluded in the contract." Id.
24. Id. at 716 (Kaufnan, J., concurring). "[I]t may be that the reasonable expectations of
the insureds will be different under property damage and liability insurance policies ... there
is a public policy consideration involved in... third party injury and the potential burden on the
public fisc in the absence of compensation." Id.
25. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1243 (Cal. 1990).
26. See Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988); Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled
by Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 23 (Cal. 1995); Pines of La Jolla
Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct. App. 1992), overruled by
Montrose, 897 P.2d 1, 23.
27. See California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (Ct. App. 1983);
see also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App.),
review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992), case transferred with directions 904 P.2d 370 (Cal.
1995); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Transanerica Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr 2d 913, 921 (Ct. App. 1994),
review granted, 889 P.2d 539 (Cal.), review dismissed and case remanded 902 P.2d 1297 (Cal.
1995). After Montrose was decided, Stonewall and Zurich were remanded to be reconsidered
in light of Montrose. Neither Stonewall nor Zurich are citable authority. They are used in this
Note solely to illustrate the confusing history, and differences of opinion, surrounding the issues
discussed in Montrose.
28. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 9.
29. MILLER, supra note 9, § 6.8. "However, the insurer's duty to defend is not necessarily
coextensive with, and may be broader than, its duty to indemnify its insured for any loss that
may ensue. This is primarily because the defense must be assumed at an early stage of the
underlying litigation and, at that time, the nature of the particular claim and of the potential
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the obligation to indemnify. 3° Therefore, insurer has the duty to defend
even if it is ultimately found to be free from liability. 31
The insurer's obligation to defend depends on the terms of the policy.32
If there are ambiguities in the contract language, they must be resolved to
give effect to the insured's objectively reasonable expectation that a defense
will be provided.33 If the facts do not clearly indicate whether the policy
has been triggered, then the insurer must tender a defense where there is the
"bare potential or possibility" of liability.34
C. The Definition of "Occurrence" in StandardForm CGL Policies
Montrose addressed CGL policies. 35 A CGL policy provides coverage
for all types of legal liability arising from bodily injury or property damage
resulting from an "occurrence. '36 The definition of the term "occurrence"
is at the heart of Montrose because, as a contract, the policy's language
determines 37when the coverage is triggered, and the extent of liability under
the policy.
The standard form CGL policy language, developed by the insurance
industry, was revised in 1973." The 1973 revisions define "occurrence" as
"an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which
results in bodily injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended by
the insured."3 9 The definition of "property damage" was also changed in
1973 to mean "physical injury to or destruction of tangible property which
occurs during the policy period ....
."' These phrases are interrelated, and
the way in which they are interpreted will affect the availability of coverage.

damages may be unclear." Id.
30. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 1993).
31. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1050; Montrose, 861 P.2d at 1157. See also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.,
419 P.2d 168, 177 (1966).
32. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1050; Montrose, 861 P.2d at 1157; Gray, 419 P.2d at 168.
33. Montrose Chem Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1995); Gray, 419 P.2d
at 172.
34. Montrose, 861 P.2d at 1160.
35. Montrose, 897 P.2d 1. "CGL" stands for Comprehensive General Liability.
36. Anderson & Plunkett, supra note 3, at 254.
37. Id. at 255.
38. Id. at 254-255. The insurance industry first developed the standard form CGL policy
in 1940-1941. It has been revised numerous times since then, in 1943, 1947, 1955, 1966, and
lastly in 1973. Id. at 454 n.19.
39. Id. at 254-255.
40. Id.
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D. Trigger of Coverage Defined
The courts have adopted at least nine different approaches to determining
when coverage is triggered.4 Montrose, however, only discusses four of the

nine possibilities: the exposure trigger; the manifestation trigger; the
continuous injury trigger; and the injury-in-fact trigger.42 The courts have
generally limited the exposure trigger and the injury-in-fact trigger to asbestos
or bodily injury cases.43 In construction defect cases involving continuous
injury, the conflict has typically been between applying either the manifestation trigger or the continuous injury trigger.44

With a continuous injury, damage is often imperceptible for a period of
time before it manifests itself. The manifestation of loss trigger focuses on
the date on which appreciable injury first becomes apparent. 45 The insur-

ance company insuring the property at that time becomes solely responsible
for indemnification, no matter how many policies were in effect during the

time the damage was occurring. 46 Therefore, 47application of the manifesta-

tion rule results in relatively narrow coverage.
Under the continuing injury trigger, property damage that is continuous
or progressively deteriorating over several policy periods is potentially
covered by all the policies on the risk48 during those periods.49 This could

include the entire period from the first exposure to harm (or from the
This provides far
wrongful act), to the time the injury is discovered.
broader coverage than a manifestation trigger because all insurers who ever
provided coverage could be held liable for damages. 5'

41. Id. at 257. These include: 1) continuous trigger; 2) injury-in-fact; 3) exposure; 4)
manifestation; 5) discovery; 6) double anchor; 7) products liability trigger; 8) loss of use; and
9) cause. Id.
42. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 16 (Cal. 1995).
43. Id. at 16, 18 n.16.
44. Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974); Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (Ct. App. 1988); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled by
Montrose, 897 P.2d at 23; Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230
(Cal. 1990); Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53
(Ct. App. 1992), overruled by Montrose, 897 P.2d at 23; Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos
Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App.), review granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992), case
transferredwith directions 904 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1995); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913 (Ct. App. 1994), review granted,889 P.2d 539 (Cal.), review dismissed and
case remanded 902 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1995); Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 20
(Ct. App. 1990).
45. Anderson & Plunkett, supra note 3, at 263.
46. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 16.
47. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 65 (1987).
48. "On the risk" is a term of art referring to an insurance policy which is providing
coverage. If an insurance company has issued a policy to an insured, the company is on the risk
of that insured's potential liability.
49. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 17.
50. Anderson & Plunkett, supra note 3, at 259.
51. JERRY, supra note 47.
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E. Case History of Application of Policy
TriggersIn Cases of ContinuingInjury
In California, the trigger of coverage in a liability policy occurs when the
complaining third party was injured, rather than when the wrongful act was
committed. 2 However, this rule does not help to assign liability when the
injury is of a continuing nature and the damage occurred over several policy
periods. In that situation, prior to Montrose, a party could find support for
applying either a manifestation or a continuous injury trigger.
CaliforniaUnion Insurance Co. v. LandmarkInsuranceCo.53 is the first
reported California case to rule on the trigger of coverage provided by
successive third party CGL policies in the context of continuous injury. In
CaliforniaUnion, the property damage was caused by a leaking pool, which
was installed during the first insurer's policy period.54 The leak manifested
itself immediately after installation, and the damage was repaired."5
Unknown to those involved, however, the true cause of the leak was not
fixed, resulting in further damage. 6 The actual cause of the57injury was not
discovered until the second insurer's policy went into effect.
The Second District Court of Appeal held that both insurers on the risk
were jointly and severally liable for the continuing damage.58 The first
insurer's coverage was triggered because the initial damage manifested itself
during its policy.
The second insurer, whose policy period began after
manifestation, was also liable for the continuous property damage occurring
during its policy period.6" The court stated that while the damage was
already initiated when the second policy went into effect, further damage had
indeed occurred during the policy, and therefore the policy was triggered.6 1
The Fourth District Court of Appeal questioned CaliforniaUnion in two
later cases, Home InsuranceCo. v. LandmarkInsurance Co.62 and Fireman's

52. The first case to set down the rule was Remmer v. Glen Falls Indemnity Co., 295 P.2d
19, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
53. California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (Ct. App. 1983).
54. Id at 463.
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id
58. California Union, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
59. Id. at 469.
60. Id. at 470.
61. The court based its reasoning on three cases which are also cited by the court in
Montrose: Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. App. 1974);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980); and Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Although Forty-Eight
Insulations and Keene were products liability cases, their policies were CGL policies, and the
court found that "any distinction is more imaginary than real." California Union, 193 Cal. Rptr.
at 472.
62. 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281-282 (Ct. App. 1988).
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Fund Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.6" In both cases, the
court faced similar construction defects in which the damage continued over
two separate policy periods.6 4 However, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
found that the court's reasoning in California Union did not pertain to either
case. It applied a manifestation trigger in both cases; the result being that
only the first carrier was liable for the damage.6"
In each case, the court declined to follow California Union because it
based its reasoning on cases in which the various carriers came on the risk
prior to manifestation of the actual injury.6 6 The court distinguished this
situation from Home and Fireman'sFund, where the second carrier came
onto the risk after manifestation of the damage.67 In both cases, the court
stated that it would violate their reading of the loss-in-progress rule68 if they
held an insurer liable for damage manifested under another insurer's
policy.69
In Fireman's Fund, the plaintiff sought to distinguish its third party
policy from Home, which dealt with a first party policy.7" This reasoning
was derived from the Garvey opinion, 1 which was decided by the California
Supreme Court after Home.72 Notwithstanding Garvey, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal refused to find any difference in the way the two types of
policies were analyzed. First, it held that the policy language used in the first
party policy in Home was "apparently identical" to the language used in the

63. 273"Cal. Rptr. 431, 433 (Ct. App. 1990) overruledby Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral
Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 23 (Cal. 1995).
64. In Home, concrete hotel balconies started chipping. The damage was first noticed when
the first insurance policy was in effect. The damage spread to more balconies during the second
policy period. Home, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 278-279. In Fireman'sFund, a construction company
made repairs to the exterior walls of a hotel. The next year, the patched areas started cracking
and falling off. The damage was identified during the first policy period, however, the actual
cause of the damage (inappropriate patching material) was not discovered until the second policy
was in effect. Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
65. Home, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280; Fireman'sFund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 431-432.
66. Home, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282. "We also have concern that California Union misapplied
three pre-manifestation cases [Gruol, Forty-Eight Insulations, and Keene] to hold a postmanifestation carrier jointly and severally liable." Id. See also Fireman'sFund, 273 Cal. Rptr.
at 432.
67. Home, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282. See also Fireman'sFund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 432-433.
68. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text. "The loss-in-progress rule provides that
once a loss becomes 'known', it is no longer insurable and the insurer's potential liability ends."
69. Home, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282. "To apportion damages and hold an insurer liable for
damage manifested in another insurer's policy period also violates the loss-in-progress rule, i.e.,
that an insurance company may insure only against contingent or unknown risks. Liability will
not be imposed under an all-property insurance policy where damages occur and are apparent
before the date the policy takes effect." Id. See also Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
70. Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
71. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. In Garvey, the court found that the
causation analysis differed substantially in first and third party insurance policies. Garvey v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989).
72. Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
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third party policy.73 Second, the court found that in cases like Fireman's
Fund and Home, where the claimant was fully compensated for his losses,
there was no need to focus on the reasonable expectations of the insured or
on a causation analysis.74
The California Supreme Court first addressed a construction defect case
concerning continuous injury in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v.
Superior Court.75 Faced with a disparity in court of appeal opinions
regarding the appropriate trigger of coverage and whether first and third party
policies should be treated differently, the supreme court defined a partial
framework for analysis.
Prudential-LMI involved a first party policy and the supreme court
applied a manifestation trigger.76 However, the supreme court also stated
that the triggers in first and third party cases should be approached differently. 77 The question of coverage in the third party liability context was
expressly reserved.7"
Contrary to expectations, in 1992, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reaffirmed Fireman's Fund. In Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v.
IndustrialIndemnity Co.,7 9 the court once again held that the manifestation
trigger applied to continuous injury covered under successive third party
policies."0 Although the supreme court had handed down Prudential-LMJ
in the interim, the court did not refer to Prudential-LMJin its opinion, and
did not raise the issue of potential differences between first and third party
policies.
That same year, the Second District Court of Appeal held in Montrose"'
8 2 that a
and in Stonewall Insurance Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates
continuous injury trigger applies to third party liability cases involving
continuous damage. The Second District Court of Appeal relied heavily

73. Id. at 434.
74. Id. at 434-444.
75. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal. 1990).
76. Id. at 1247.
77. Id. at 1246. The court quotes several "commentators" regarding the need for differential
treatment of first and third party policies. However, it does not actually point to any specific
reasons behind the distinction.
78. Id.
79. Pines of La Jolla Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Ct.
App. 1992), overruledby Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 23 (Cal. 1995).
80. Id. at 57.
81. The Second District Court of Appeal heard Montrose at the appellate level.
82. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App.),
review granted 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992), case transferredwith directions 904 P.2d 370 (Cal.
1995).
83. Id. at 672.
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on its previous opinion in California Union 4 and on the California Supreme
Court's lead in Prudential-LM 5 in coming to its decision.

Thus, as of 1992, the California appellate courts continued to be in
disagreement regarding the appropriate trigger of coverage for continuous
injury cases. The supreme court resolved the issue in the context of first
party insurance in Prudential-LAM by applying a manifestation trigger.
However, its statement that third party cases should be handled differently did
not provide a clear enough framework for the appellate courts. The Fourth

District Court of Appeal continued to apply a manifestation trigger to third
party cases, while the Second District Court of Appeal applied a continuous
trigger.
Finally, in the last third party, continuous injury case heard by the
appellate courts prior to Montrose, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
repudiated its approach in Fireman'sFund and Pines of La Jolla. In Zurich
Insurance Co. v. TransamericaInsurance Co., 6 the court concluded that a
continuous injury trigger should be used in the context of a third party case
involving continuous or progressively deteriorating damage. 7
The Zurich court reasoned that there are different discovery requirements

in first and third party policies which make different triggers appropriate for
each."8 The court also stated that the manifestation trigger is not particularly

applicable when one analyzes the definition of "occurrence" in third party
liability policies.8 9 Finally, the court reasoned that in a multi-unit project,

84. Id. at 671. The court cites CaliforniaUnion and quotes:
(1)"[I]n a 'one occurrence' case involving continuous, progressive, and deteriorating
damage, the carrier in whose policy period the damage first becomes apparent remains
on the risk until damage is finally and totally complete notwithstanding a policy
provision which purports to limit coverage solely to accidents/occurrences within the
time parameters of the stated policy term"; and (2) an insurance carrier coming on the
risk after such damage becomes apparent is also liable for indemnification of the
insured where the "damage causing force" already in motion causes further damage.
Id. (citations omitted).
85. Id at 672.
We conclude that Prudential-LMI's analytical framework requires that in third-part/liability insurance involving continuous and repeated exposure to a continuing
series of loss causing events of the same character a "continuous trigger" of coverage
applies: all carriers on the risk from inception of harm to the time the loss is no
longer contingent are liable to the insured.

Id
86. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913 (Ct. App. 1994), review
granted, 889 P.2d 539 (Cal.), review dismissed and case remanded902 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1995).
87. Id. at 915.
88. Id. at 920.
89. Id. at 921.
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"the entire contingency insured against by an insurance policy cannot be said
to have materialized when one particular defect is noted at one unit."9
F. Loss-in-Progress
While the trigger theories indicate when coverage is to begin, it is the

loss-in-progress, or "known loss," rule which dictates when it will end. The
loss-in-progress rule is codified in California Insurance Code sections 22 and
250, which define insurance and limit insurability to "contingent or unknown"
events. 9 The loss-in-progress rule provides that once a loss becomes
"known," it is no longer insurable, and the insurer's potential liability ends.
However, the phrase "contingent or unknown" is not a self defining term,92
and the courts have interpreted it with conflicting results.93
When applying the loss-in-progress rule to first party continuous injury
cases, the courts agree that an injury ceases to be "contingent" when it first
manifests itself.94 The results have been different, however, when the lossin-progress rule has been applied to third party continuous injury cases. Prior
to Zurich, the Fourth District Court of Appeal had held that section 22

applied to both first and third party cases.95 It also stated that "[i]t is the
damage which must be 'contingent or unknown' and not the liability of the

insured or the cause of the damage."96
In Montrose and Stonewall, the Second District Court of Appeal
disagreed with the Fourth District's interpretation of sections 22 and 250.
The court pointed out that the statutory language is worded in the disjunctive
and that it is the liability of the insured that must be contingent or unknown,
not the damage or the loss.97 The court explained that if at the time the

90. Id.
91. CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1993) ("Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to
indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown
event."); CAL. INS. CODE § 250 (West 1993) ("[A]ny continuous or unknown event, whether past
or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest, or create a liability against
him, may be insured against .... ).
92. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 677 (Ct. App.
1992), review granted 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992), cause transferred with directions 34 Cal. App.
4th 1855 (Oct. 1995).
93. Compare Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 273 Cal. Rptr. 431,
434 (Ct. App. 1990), overruled in Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 23
(Cal. (1995). ("It is the damage which must be 'contingent or unknown' and not the liability of
the insured or the cause of the damage") with Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677-678 and Zurich
Ins. Co.'v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr 2d 913, 919-921 (Ct. App. 1994) review granted,
889 P.2d 539 (Cal.), review dismissed and case remanded 902 P.2d 1297 (Cal. 1995) (holding
that it is the liability or risk which must be contingent or unknown, not the damage).
94. E.g., Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1246-1247
(Cal. 1990).
95. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 282 n.4 (Ct. App. 1988);
Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
96. Fireman's Fund, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434 n.5.
97. Stonewall, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.
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policy was issued the liability of the insured was unknown, then the risk was
insurable."8 This is the case even if the injury were inevitable,9" such as
with a latent. 0 soils problem.
Two years after the Second District Court of Appeal handed down
Montrose and Stonewall, the Fourth District Court of Appeal backtracked on
its stand regarding the application of the loss-in-progress rule in third party
continuous injury cases. It admitted in Zurich that theirs was a "rather
narrow definition of contingency," and "[a]n equally correct interpretation"
would be that applied by the Second District Court of Appeal.'
III. MONTROSE CHEMICAL CORP. OF CALIFORNIA V.
ADMIRAL INSURANCE CO.

A. Facts of the Case
Montrose was a defunct chemical company that manufactured the
pesticide DDT from 1947 to 1982.102 Between 1960 and 1986, Montrose
was insured under CGL policies from seven different carriers." 3 Admiral
Insurance Company had issued four separate CGL policies to Montrose
between 1982 and 1986.'
Admiral's CGL policies incorporated the
standard industry language and provided for indemnity for bodily injury or
property damage caused by an "occurrence."' 5
The lawsuit was initiated by Montrose in order to determine which of the
seven insurers were obligated to defend the company in five separate actions
brought against it. These five underlying lawsuits involved Montrose's
disposal of hazardous waste at two sites in California, Stringfellow and Levin
Metals."' 6 All five actions alleged property damage due to contamination

98. Id.

99. Id.
100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 337.15(b) (West 1982) ("'[L]atent deficiency' means a
deficiency which is not apparent by reasonable inspection.").
101. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913, 920 (Ct. App. 1994),
review granted,889 P.2d 539 (1995), review dismissed and case remanded902 P.2d 1297 (Cal.

1995).

102. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1995).
103. Id. at 4 n.4. The seven carriers include: Insurance Company of North America,
American Motorists Insurance Company, The Travelers Indemnity Company, National Union Fire
Insurance Company, Canadian Universal Insurance Company, Centaur Insurance Company and
Admiral Insurance Company.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss2/6

12

1996]

MONTROSE
CHEMICAL
CORP.
V ADMIRAL
Co. Co.
371
Borkenhagen:
Montrose
Chemical
Corp. v. INSURANCE
Admiral Insurance
and Its Effects

which had10 7continued throughout the periods in which Admiral's policies were
in effect.

Montrose requested its seven insurance carriers, including Admiral, to

defend it in this matter. 8 All of the carriers, except Admiral, agreed to
provide a defense subject to a reservation of rights.0 9
In 1989, Admiral filed a motion for summary judgment requesting the
trial court find that Admiral had no duty to defend or indemnifyr Montrose."0 Admiral contended that the "occurrence" of property damage at

the Levin Metals site had been triggered prior to its policy periods when the
damage had been discovered."'
Admiral also claimed that at the
Stringfellow site the contamination was an uninsurable "loss-in-progress"
prior to the issuance of the first Admiral policy in October of 1982.1'2 This

loss-in-progress claim was based on an August 1982 letter in which the EPA
informed Montrose that it considered Montrose potentially responsible for
contribution of clean-up costs at the Stringfellow site." 3
The trial court granted Admiral's motion on both grounds."' Montrose
appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal reversed." 5 Admiral
then petitioned for, and was granted, review by the California Supreme
Court.",6

107. Id. at 4-6. The actions underlying Montrose include: 1) United States of America, et
al. v. J.B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al. (The basis for the claim was strict liability under CERCLA
for generating the toxic waste shipped to the Stringfellow site); 2) Newman, et. al. v. J.B. Stringfellow, Jr., et al. (Numerous plaintiffs seek damages from Montrose and other defendants alleged
to have resulted from the release of contaminants from the Stringfellow site); 3) Parr-Richmond
Terminal Co., et al. v. Levin Metals Corp., et al.; 4) Levin Metals Corp., et al. v. Parr-Richmond
Terminal Co., et al.; 5) Levin Metals Corp., et al. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., et al. Cases
3, 4 & 5 are all integrated. They are based on a CERCLA claim. Montrose's liability arises
from the fact that it shipped chemicals to the site which were used by an independent company
in formulating other chemical products. Id.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 6-7. When an insurer issues a reservation of rights notice, it is informing the
insured that it will provide a defense while retaining the right to later claim noncoverage under
the policy. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 268 (3d ed. 1996).
110. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 7.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 5. On August 23, 1982, six weeks before Admiral's first policy with Montrose
went into effect, Montrose was notified by the EPA that it considered Montrose a potentially
responsible party (PRP) for response costs at the Stringfellow site. Id.
114. Id. at 7.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 7-8.
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B. The CaliforniaSupreme Court's Analysis
1. Trigger of Coverage
By the time Montrose reached the supreme court, there was great conflict
in the lower courts regarding the coverage analysis the application of the
manifestation and continuous injury triggers in various continuous injury
construction defect cases. The California Supreme Court needed to address
and settle this issue.
In Montrose, the supreme court held that all third party policies in effect
during a period of continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage
were potentially liable for indemnification." 7 Those insurers therefore had
the duty to defend, even if the policy expired prior to manifestation of the
injury.
In determining what trigger to apply in a case of third party liability
involving continuous or progressively deteriorating property damage, the
supreme court analyzed several factors. These include: the differences
between first and third party policies;"' the policy language;" 9 and practical and public policy considerations. 2
a. First and Third Party Policies
First, the supreme court distinguished third party liability insurance from
first party property insurance.' 2 ' The court reasoned that property insurance
is a contract by which the insured is covered for certain enumerated
"perils."'2
The cause of the loss in this context is usually a fortuitous
event such as an explosion, fire, or wind.'
By contrast, liability coverage
is concerned
with "traditional tort concepts of fault, proximate cause and
24
duty.'

The supreme court found that another important distinction between first
and third party policies is the parties' expectations.' 25 First party insureds
usually purchase sufficient insurance to cover their maximum potential
losses.'
Third party insureds, on the other hand, can only "guess about
its potential exposure to third parties."' 27

Id at 27.
Id. at 9.
Id.
at 11.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 9.
Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id. at 10.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

126. Id.

127. Id.
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Other distinctions between the two types of policies include the requirements in a first party policy that the loss be "discovered" within the policy
period, 2 ' and that the insurer be notified within a certain period after "the
inception of the loss."129 These two requirements are not imposed in third
party liability policies. 30
b. Admiral's Policy Language
After addressing the factors to be considered in determining the
appropriate trigger of coverage, the court turned to Admiral's policy
language. The supreme court concluded, after reviewing the standard
industry CGL language in Admiral's policies, that the policy "clearly and
explicitly provides that the occurrence of bodily injury or property damage
during the policy period is the operative event that triggers coverage.1 31
The supreme court also conducted an extensive review of the drafting
history of the policy language.'32 It found that when the drafters of the
standard "occurrence" language added the phrase "injurious exposure to
conditions" to the original terminology, they contemplated the policy
providing coverage for all damage from continuous injury which occurred
during the policy period.'33
c. Practical and Public Policy Considerations
In explaining why the continuous injury trigger should be applied to third
party continuous injury claims, the supreme court also looked at practical and
policy considerations. 34 Admiral raised the practical concern of how a

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.

Id at 10.
Id. at 13. The supreme court quotes Admiral's policy as follows:

Admiral contracted with Montrose to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of... property
damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence ....
[P]roperty
damage to which this insurance applies" is defined in Admiral's policies as "physical
injury to or destruction of tangible property which occurs during the policy period.
Furthermore, "occurrence" is defined in Admiral's policies as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury
or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."
Id. at 13.
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 15.
134. Id. at 24.
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continuous injury trigger would affect insurance industry reserves.'35 The
court assured Admiral that reserves would not be negatively affected by a
continuous injury trigger' because the courts "generally apply equitable
considerations to spread the cost among the several policies and insurers."' 7
However, the court did not detail how apportionment of costs would be
determined.
Perhaps the most convincing practical consideration the court raised is the
distinction between an occurrence based policy, 31 such as Admiral's, and
a claims-made policy.'3 9 In a continuous injury situation, damages may not
become apparent until many years after the existing occurrence policy has
expired. However, the insurer whose policy was in effect when the injury
occurred is still liable for the damage. 40 This is a disadvantage for the
insurer because it has no way of knowing whether it still may carry liability
for expired
policies.' 4 ' This period of lingering liability is known as the
42
",tail."'

A claims-made policy, on the other hand, limits coverage to the single
policy in effect when the insured has a claim made against him, regardless of
when the injury occurred. 43 This is an advantage for the insurer for it can
be certain that when the policy expires, so does its liability. 44 There is no
"tail." Because of this restriction, the carrier can more easily establish the
amount145of its reserves. It also has less exposure, and can charge less for the
policy.
In Montrose, the supreme court reasoned if a manifestation trigger were
applied to an occurrence based policy, it would effectively transform a
broader and more expensive policy into a claims-made policy. 146 This is
because with a manifestation trigger, the insurer is only liable for injuries
which actually appear within the policy period, effectively disposing of the
"tail" problem.

135. Id.at 25. The reserves are the funds an insurance company must keep on hand to
enable it to cover its liability in any given year. This figure is not equal to the total possible
liability on its outstanding policies. Rather, it is the amount the insurer predicts that it will
actually be liable for, in any given year, based on experience tables. DOBBYN, supra note 110,
at 71-72.
136. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 25.
137. Id.
138. An occurrence policy provides coverage if the damage or injury occurs during the
policy period, regardless of when the claim was filed with the insurance company. JERRY, supra
note 47, § 62a.
139. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 26.
140. JERRY, supra note 47, § 62a.
141. Id.
142. Id.("[The tail is] the lapse of time between the date of the act or neglect and the time
the claim is made.").

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 26 (Cal. 1995).
146. Id. at 27.
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2. The Loss-in-Progress Rule
Montrose'ssecond significant holding concerned the loss-in-progress rule.
The Court held that even if the policy went into effect after the manifestation
of the injury, the insurer remains on the risk and retains the duty to defend
until the insured's liability is certain. 14 7 The supreme court found that, in
the context of third party coverage involving continuous injury, liability(not
damage) which is contingent at the time the policy is issued is insurable. 48
This is in accord with the Second District's position on the loss-in-progress
rule. As Justice Baxter notes in his concurring opinion in Montrose, "a literal
application of this theory would allow the purchase of liability insurance for
a completed tort up to the moment a final damage judgment is imposed upon
the tortfeasor."' 4 9

IV. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED
While Montrose put to rest two hotly debated insurance issues, there are
several remaining questions which must be answered before coverage for
continuous construction defect injuries can be determined. These issues
include: 1) how the defense is handled, 2) the types of construction defects
which fall into the "continuous" or "progressively deteriorating" category, 3)
the total amount of coverage the insured can collect, and 4) how to apportion
the defense costs and indemnity among the triggered policies. The remainder
of this Note will focus on fashioning a satisfactory method of handling these
outstanding issues, based on hints given in Montrose and on other case law.
A. Is the Injury Continuous?
Not all construction defect claims will have the same trigger. The type
of trigger applied will depend upon whether the defect is defined as "continuous."15 Of the many defective items being contested in a typical construction defect case, only a few will come under the category of "continuous" or
"progressively deteriorating. 1 5 '
With many construction defects, the damage and the manifestation will
occur simultaneously, such as a chipped bathtub or an exploding heater. With

147. Id. at 29.
148. Id. at 29. The court cites to the following cases to illustrate its conclusions: Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Condict, 417 F. Supp. 63, 73 (S.D. Miss. 1976); City of Johnstown, N.Y. v.
Bankers Standard Ins., 877 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1989); Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d
894, 920 (Haw. 1994).
149. Montrose Chem. Corp., 897 P.2d at 31 (Baxter, J., concurring).
150. Interview with Alan Johnston, Partner, Duke, Gerstel, Shearer & Bregante, in San
Diego, Cal. (Sept. 1995).
151. Id.
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this type of injury, a manifestation trigger would be appropriate, and only one
policy would be triggered.
However, with other types of construction defects, the injury is
continuous from the date of installation to the date of manifestation (or
actually, to the date of repair). The most obvious examples would be spalling
concrete, dry rot, or faulty soil compaction. With these types of defects, the
initial negligence of the builder creates a defective condition which is not
immediately apparent, but which causes injury over a period of time,
ultimately resulting in observable damage. The continuous injury trigger
would apply to these defects, and all the policies in effect during the period
of damage would be triggered.
Many other types of damage could also fall into the "continuous or
progressively deteriorating" category.' 52 The category of damage, and
therefore the trigger to be applied, will ultimately be left to the experts to
determine.' 5' The experts will not only need to ascertain the type of
damage, but they will also have to calculate the period in which the damage
occurred.' 54 In many cases, continuous damage will be able to be traced
to the time of installation. However, in some instances damage may not
begin until some time after installation, and then will continue from that point
on. 5' If this is the case, fewer policies will be triggered.
Now that different triggers may be applied to different types of damage,
another layer has been added to the litigation process. This will result in a
battle of experts. There will continue to be the usual experts 5 ' debating
whether a defect exists. Now, however, there will also be experts from the
various insurance companies arguing over the category of a particular defect.
B. Duty to Defend
In Montrose, the court found that every policy on the risk during the
period of continuous injury may have the duty to defend.' 57 The court
rejected joint and several liability,'5 8 which means that the insured cannot

152. Damage such as: stains which worsen over time; windows which spring more and more
leaks over the years; and bathroom tiles which loosen and periodically fall off, could also be
considered "continuous."
153. Interview with Alan Johnston, Partner, Duke, Gerstel, Shearer & Bregante, in San
Diego, Cal. (Sept. 1995).
154. Id.
155. An example could be roof tiles which are not nailed properly. They may be
satisfactory for a few years, but become dislodged after a particularly bad storm. From that point
on, they may be responsible for leaks which cause a dry rot condition in an attic space for a
number of years until ultimately discovered and repaired.
156. Representing the home owners and the developers.
157. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1995).
158. Id. at 21 n.19.
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pick and choose who he wants to defend him, but that all insurers must
defend in total. 5 9
Montrose did not address how the defense process will operate in
practice. Once a claim is filed against a policyholder, he must inform all the
insurers who are potentially liable. There will probably be disagreement
among the parties as each interprets Montrose in his favor. Insurer's may
claim that they need not tender a defense until the insured can establish that
the injury occurred within their policy periods. Insureds will argue that it is
the carrier's responsibility to determine whether their policy has been
triggered.
Insurers, however, should accept their duty to defend, without waiting for
a court ruling. As stated above, an insurer must tender a defense whenever
there is the "bare potential or possibility" of liability. 6 If an insurer refuses a defense, and it is later determined that they are liable, its "limits are
opened" and it becomes responsible for all costs in the action. 6'
While Montrose did not address how defense costs would be allocated
when multiple policies are triggered, past cases have discussed the issue.
Unfortunately, the courts do not agree on a solution. As with allocation of
liability, some courts hold that defense costs should be apportioned according
to the amount of contribution to the judgment against the insured. 62 Other
courts have held that defense costs should be prorated on the basis of the
amount of coverage afforded.' 63
Montrose does not address how a policyholder should proceed. What can
the insured do to move his case along and obtain the defense he paid for?
Who has the responsibility to iron things out? In Keene Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of North America,'64 the court held that the policyholder could select
one insurer to defend and indemnify him up front while the tort suit was
being heard.' 65 After liability was established at trial, the various insurers
could allocate indemnity and seek contribution among themselves, without
bothering the victim or the insured.'66 The court found this approach would
promote judicial efficiency, and would stop indemnity battles between
insurers from interfering with the main suit.'67

159. Interview with Robert Shoecraft, Partner, Duke, Gerstel, Shearer & Bregante, in San
Diego, Cal. (Sept. 1995).
160. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1160 (Cal. 1993).
161. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 178-179 (Cal. 1966).
162. See Signal Companies v. Harbor Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1980); see also
Olympic Ins. Co. v. Employers Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 908, 913 (Ct. App. 1981).
163. See Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 792, 798 (Ct.
App. 1986).
164. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
165. Id. at 1051.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 1051 n.38.
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In the interest of clarity and judicial efficiency, the California courts
should adopt Keene and require that one carrier handle the defense of a case.
The insured's attorney should take charge of organizing the carriers at the
beginning; he should not rely on them to take responsibility for coordinating
themselves and cooperating with each other. After the responsible insurers
have been identified, they should have the opportunity to reach an agreement
amongst themselves to determine which one will provide a defense. Only if
they cannot come to an agreement within a reasonable period of time will the
insured be allowed to choose a particular insurer to defend him.
After trial, the carriers can meet and apportion liability and defense costs.
This may result in further litigation, but the victim and the insured will no
longer be involved, leaving the dispute up to those contractually obligated to
deal with it.
C Setting the Liability Limit: Stacking
1. Case History
If damage is determined to be "continuous," and a number of polices
have been triggered, the question arises of how much the insured can collect.
If the amount of liability incurred is within the limits of one year's coverage,
the insured can simply apportion indemnity between the various triggered
policies. However, if the liability incurred is greater than the highest single
policy limit of those policies triggered, the insured will want to combine two
or more policies, termed "stacking," in order to obtain full coverage. The
question becomes whether stacking of policies should be allowed, or whether
the court should impose a limit on how much the insured can collect.
Stacking is not a method of allocation between multiple policies.168 It
is a way by which the limit of coverage may be determined when multiple
policies are triggered. Regardless of whether stacking is allowed, once the
amount of liability is determined, the various insurers will have to allocate the
costs of indemnity among themselves.
Outside of California, the majority of states hold that when multiple
successive policies are triggered in a case of continuous injury, their limits
may not be stacked.' 6 9 The California Supreme Court has not yet ruled on

168. But see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(erroneously listing stacking and joint and several liability as methods of allocation, although
ultimately rejecting both).
169. John K. DiMugno, Montrose v. Admiral Insurance Co.: The California Supreme
Court's Attempt to Clean Up the Coverage Mess, INS. LITIG. REP. 308, at 314-15 (1995).
"[Stacking] divorces the coverage from the injuries triggering the coverage; it simply lumps all
the injuries into one large pool . . . .Finally, even with the same insurer on both policies,
stacking in this manner makes the aggregate limits and the separately negotiated premiums for
each policy illusory by expanding coverage to the sum of both policies." Id. (quoting Uniroyal,
Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1391 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)). The article goes on to state,
"Louisiana and Minnesota appear to be the only jurisdictions that permits (sic) stacking in the
context of cumulative injury tort cases." Id. at 315.
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this issue. 17 However, this question must be answered before Montrose
can have any real effect.
Those searching Montrose for hints on how to approach the stacking
issue may look to footnote nineteen. There, the court rejected the tort
principle of joint and several liability, in favor of the application of contract
law principles "to the express terms and limitations of the various policies of
insurance on the risk.''
If contract law principles are applied to the
stacking question, however, conflicting interpretations can still be made
regarding the "one occurrence" clause in the policy.'
Therefore, the
language in footnote nineteen does not offer any concrete guidance.
Insureds may look to Montrose's approval of a Washington State
Appellate case, Gruol Construction Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America,173 as supporting stacking. Montrose interprets the Gruol opinion as
stating that "an insurer would become liable at any point in the process for
the entire loss up to the policy limits, even though the continuing injury or
progressively deteriorating damage may extend over several policy periods.'

74

This statements appears to suggest that the court may allow insureds to
recover over one policy's limit. However, Montrose's interpretation of Gruol
is based on Gruol's trigger analysis and on its adoption of joint and several
liability (which Montrose rejects as a tort concept), and not on a discussion
of stacking. The stacking issues does note arise in Gruol, and therefore
Montrose's approval of the case cannot be used as an argument in favor of
stacking. Thus, neither policyholders nor insurers may rely on the language
in Montrose to further their respective assertions regarding the stacking issue.
Although the stacking question was not taken up in Montrose, there are
two continuous injury cases recently remanded by the California Supreme
Court to be reconsidered in light of Montrose, which address this issue. It
remains to be seen whether the appellate courts will alter their approaches to

170. Id. at 313.
171. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 21 n.19 (Cal. 1995). This
is in line with Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., as well as other case law. See Armstrong
World Industries v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 60 (Ct. App. 1993),
review granted, 886 P.2d 1311 (Cal. 1994), vacated and remanded, 904 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1995)
("f[In Keene, the court distinguished the doctrine of joint and several tort liability, applicable to
the rights of the victim, from the contractual liability of the insurers to Keene.... )" After
Montrose was decided, Armstrong was remanded to be reconsidered in light of Montrose,
Therefore, Armstrong is no longer citable authority. It is used in this Note solely to illustrate the
different approaches taken by the lower courts prior to Montrose. See also Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980) ("jI]n allocating the
cost of indemnification under the exposure theory [similar to a continuous injury theory], only
contract law is involved [not tort law]. Each insurer is liable for its pro rata share. The insurer's
liability is not 'joint and several', it is individual and proportionate.").
172. Does "one occurrence" mean one occurrence in total (no stacking), or one occurrence
per year (stacking allowed)? See discussion of Stonewall, infra notes 178-182 and accompanying
text.
173. Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. App. 1974).
174. Montrose, 897 P.2d at 19.
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stacking on remand. Since Montrose did not address the stacking issue, the
lower courts cannot look to the supreme court for guidance. In Armstrong
World Industries v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the trial court rejected
stacking. 7 5 The court stated that the insured was not entitled to get "more

than it bargained for."' 76

The insureds did not challenge the ruling on

appeal.77

In contrast, the appellate court in Stonewall allowed stacking. 7 1 Stonewall involved a situation where there were three policies issued in three
consecutive years, each with a limit of $300,000 per year.'79 The court
found that all the relevant policies included the standard CGL language which
stated that all damage arising from a continuous and repeated exposure is
deemed a single occurrence.'
Did this mean that the insured could collect
only up to $300,000 because the injury is considered a "single occurrence"

in total? Or does this mean that the insured could collect $900,000 because
the injury caused a "single occurrence" per year? The court found this
language to be ambiguous and therefore read it in favor of the insured,

allowing him to collect the stacked limit of $900,000."'
Both the Montrose and Stonewall opinions cited Keene with approval,

although neither case referenced Keene's stance on stacking.'

With

Keene's approach, the victim would be compensated up to one policy's limits
(which would presumably be set by the highest possible limit). 3 While
Keene did state that "every policy is liable up to its limits,"'8 4 this was

meant to ensure security for the insured in case, for some reason, all other

175. Armstrong, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60.
176. DiMugno, supra note 169, at 313-314. "[While] every triggered policy has an
independent obligation to respond in full to a clam.., that does not entitle an insured to get
more than it bargained for .... The policy holder cannot reasonably expect more simply because
2d
at 60. "[Iheclaims
asbestos-related
trial court's
triggerdecision
more than
one that
policy.
... " Id. See Armstrong, 26 Cal. Rptr.
ensures
the policyholder
is indemnified by one insurer
mhose
were
for the policies
full extent
of triggered
the loss upbytothe
We findliability
theasbestos-bodily
policy's limits, injury.
but apportions
all insurers
nothinganong
erroneous
in that
decision."
ild

177.
DiMugno, supra note 169, at 314.
178. Stonewall Ins.

Co. v. Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Ct. App.), review
granted, 834 P.2d 1147 (Cal. 1992), case transferredwith directions, 904 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1995).
179. Id. at 685.

180. Id. at 685-686.

181. Id.
182. Montrose relied on Keene in its trigger analysis. Both Ca2ifornia Union and Stonewall
erroneously relied on Keene as applying joint and several liability when multiple policies are
triggered. However, as the Armstrong court points out. Keene has been misinterpreted; it does
not hold that insurers are to be held jointly and severally liable: "[I]n Keene, the court distinguished the doctrine ofjoint and several tort liability, applicable to the rights of the victim, from
the contractual liability of the insurers to Keene, [the insured]." Armstrong, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
183. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1049-1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
184. Id. at 1050.
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triggered policies could not pay. 8 ' Keene still established a single policy
limit on the total amount a claimant could collect.
The stacking issue may be the most important unanswered question
following Montrose. If stacking is approved, insured's could recover far
more for damages than they could have previously. On the other hand,
insurers would stand to lose vast amounts of money. Although each side has
valid legal arguments, the answer may well turn on public policy factors.
2. Public Policy
a. Arguments in Support of Stacking
There are numerous public policy considerations which the courts must
address when deciding whether to allow stacking. It has already been shown
that applying contract principles to the standard CGL policy language does
not establish whether stacking was bargained for by the policyholder.
Montrose found, however, that the language in the standard CGL policy can
bring on a reasonable expectation in the insured that coverage is afforded
under all the policies.' 86 Also, the courts have long held that public policy
favors finding coverage when reasonably possible.'
Additionally, if the
policy language is ambiguous, it is weighed in favor of the insured.'88
Montrose also showed that the insurance industry knew and approved of
a continuous trigger when it was drafting its policy language. 8 If this is
the case, carriers should have been putting aside sufficient reserves to cover
all the risks to which the policy language exposed them. Therefore, carriers
cannot now claim that stacking will deplete their reserves. 9 '
While stacking will increase costs for the insurance companies, the goal
of the tort system is to have insurers absorb the costs of indemnity, and then
distribute the cost through society by charging the necessary premiums. In
the context of construction defect litigation, increased premiums would likely
cause developers to raise the price of homes. This could ultimately benefit
homeowners by spreading the risk from the individual with a defective home
to society at large.
b. Arguments Against Stacking
First, one might agree that the CGL policy language gave the insured the
reasonable expectation that he would be protected by all the policies in effect

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1, 15 (Cal. 1995).
Id. at 12.
Id.
See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
Montrose, 897 P.2d at 12.
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during the time period of the injury. However, this only means that the
insured expected that all the policies would be triggered. It does not mean
that he reasonably expected that he would be indemnified for an amount
equaling the total coverage of all the polices added together.
Second, while the drafting history of the CGL policy may show that the

insurance industry favored a continuous trigger, it did so because it wanted

to spread risk among a number of companies, among other reasons.' 9 ' No
where did the drafters state that the industry favors the stacking of policies.
Third, while one of the goals of the tort system is to spread the costs of
liability to society at large through insurance polices, this would not be the
result if stacking was applied to construction defect cases. The high costs of
construction defect litigation have already caused American insurance
companies to either raise their rates beyond what many developers can pay,
92

or to pull out of the developer liability insurance market in California.'

If policies are stacked, this situation will only become worse.
This predicament is particularly severe with condominiums, which are
the primary subjects of construction defect litigation.'93 Because of this,
condominium builders must have liability insurance.
Complicating the issue is the fact that condominium purchasers are often

first time home buyers or people seeking affordable housing. California
already has among the highest priced housing in the country, with low or
medium income families often priced out of the market altogether. Builders
credit both insurance costs and the unavailability of insurance, for their
inability to construct affordable homes.' 94 The most affected by rising

191. Id. at 26. Among the reasons relied on for not incorporating a manifestation trigger
into the standard definition were several stated equitable concerns: "the difficulty of applying
such limitations or requirements in cases of continuing damage or injury over the course of
successive policy periods, the uncertainty of who would bear the burden of a discovery
requirement (i.e., the insured or third party claimants), the arbitrariness, from the carrier's
perspective, of telescoping all damage in a continuing injury case into a single policy period, and
the fear that policy-holders could be disadvantaged by such a approach." Id.
192. Construction Mag., "Builders Scramble for Insurance," June 1995; Thor K. Biberman,
Defect Lawsuits Could Signal End of Attached Product, SAN DIEGo DAILY TRANSCRIrT, Nov.
6, 1995, at BI; Van Housen, supra note 11 (stating that "[p]remiums paid by condo builders for
liability insurance have increased tenfold since 1980.... while the number of insurance carriers
who offered such coverage a decade ago topped 40, they can now be counted on one hand");
Dwight Hansen, Commentary on Insurance, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at 11 (Hansen, a lobbyist
for the building industry, states "[n]ot a single state-admitted insurance carrier is covering
liability for condo or multifamily construction right now. . . . The only liability insurance
available is from higher-risk, higher-premium carriers located out of state").
193. See Van Housen, supra note 11; Biberman, supra note 192; Ricardo Sandoval, When
the Roof FallsIn, 12-SEP CAL. LAW. 45 (1992) ("mhe question is not if there will be a claim,
but when will the claim come and how big will it be?").
194. Construction Magazine, supra note 192; Biberman, supra note 192; Andrea Adelson,
Post-Growth O.C. Is Ripe for Building Defect Cases, L.A. TIMEs, May 30, 1995, at I (stating
that the affordable housing shortage is a byproduct of construction defect litigation); Hansen,
supra note 195 ("This epidemic of construction defect lawsuits is killing off the supply of
affordable housing in Orange County and is spreading throughout the state .... Since they can't
get insurance to do multifamily, condominium or planned-unit developments, many builders are
changing their business plans and won't build these projects anymore, particularly those involving
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insurance costs are also those least able to absorb them. By allowing
stacking, the courts would be making it even more difficult for developers to
provide reasonably priced housing. This would run counter to the aims of the
strict liability/tort system. The costs of indemnifying builders cannot be
spread throughout society through higher housing prices; the market cannot
support more expensive homes.
In addition, by allowing stacking, the courts would be sending the wrong
message to builders. There is no incentive for builders to select qualified
subcontractors, or to ensure that quality materials are being installed, if they
know that they have a huge pool of insurance to cover even the most costly
defects. Money which would go to pay greater insurance costs under a
stacking system, would be better spent in higher quality construction.
Thus, relevant law and policy suggests the best long-range solution would
be to prohibit stacking. In construction defect cases involving continuous or
progressively deteriorating injury, the insured should be restricted to
collecting the highest single limit of those policies triggered.
D. Allocation of Indemnity
After determining the nature of the damage, which policies are triggered,
and the limit of the amount of coverage, the court must allocate the liability
among the triggered policies. When allocating, the court must first check the
language of the policies regarding the allocation of liability among insurers. 9 However, such provisions are not always included, and when they
are, they sometimes conflict.'
Courts must then step in and apportion the
liability as they see fit.
Montrose states that indemnity should be apportioned along contract
principles,' 97 and that the courts should apply equitable considerations.' 98
Both statements are quite vague. The court only directly addresses the
allocation issue in its statement that "[t]he task may require allocation of
contribution among all the insurers on the risk in proportion to their
respective policies' liability limits (such as deductibles and ceilings) or the
time periods covered under each such policy."' 99 Again, this issue must be
decided before Montrose can be practically implemented.

homeowners associations.").
195. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 677 F.2d 1034, 1050 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The court refers to provisions which allocate liability according to "Contribution by Equal
Shares," under which all insurers share liability equally, and according to "Contribution by
Limits," under which insurers contribute in proportion to their policy limits.
196. Armstrong World Industries v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 58
(1993), review granted,886 P.2d 1311 (Cal. 1994), vacated and remanded,904 P.2d 370 (Cal.
1995).
197. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 897 P.2d 1,21 n.19 (Cal. 1995). 2d at 344
198. Id. at 26.
199. Id. at 10-11.
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The supreme court expressly declined "to formulate a definitive rule
applicable in every case" where multiple insurers cover the same risk.2"'
It may be possible, however, to fashion a workable rule which would apply

injury. Case'
specifically to construction defect cases involving continuous
20 1
law has defined at least four methods of allocation:
1)
based on the proportion of injuries which actually occurred during
the policy period; 0 2

2)
3)

4)

23
based on the "time on the risk";
24

based on each policy's limits;

based on the policy limits multiplied by the years of coverage
formula.0 5

The least workable approach in construction defect cases involves basing

allocation on the actual injury incurred during the policy period.20 6 Defects
are often not discovered until destructive testing, °7 takes place; no one has
witnessed the progression of the injury. Even if the defect is visible, there

is rarely any qualitative evidence showing the extent of the injury in any
given period. For example, it would be virtually impossible for experts to
determine how much dry rot occurred in year four, as opposed to year five.
This would entail pure guesswork, and would needlessly prolong and confuse
an already complicated procedure.
The other three methods do not involve conjecture; they are based on
formulas. To illustrate how each method works, consider the example of a
construction defect involving faulty soils compaction. At trial, the injury is

found to have begun at the time of grading, and to have been continuous and
progressively deteriorating during a five year period, at the end of which a
landslide occurs. Over the five years, the builder purchased coverage from
200. Signal Co.'s v. Harbor Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1980). "We expressly decline
to formulate a definitive rule applicable in every case in light of varying equitable considerations
which may arise, and which affect the insured and the primary and excess carriers, and which
depend upon the particular policies of insurance, the nature of the claim made, and the relation
of the insured to the insurers." Id.
201. Other approaches include apportionment based on: 1) the premiums paid (Insurance Co.
of Texas v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 143, 147, 151 (S. D. Cal. 1958));
2) in equal shares (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Saint Paul Surplus Lines Ins., 753 F.2d 1288, 1292 (4th
Cir. 1985)); 3) using "maximum loss" method (Mission Ins. Co. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co.,
626 P.2d 505 (Wash. 1981).
202. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
203. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
204. See Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 492 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1972); see also
Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 792 (Ct. App. 1986); see also
CNA Casualty v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1986).
205. See Armstrong World Industries v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35 (Ct.
App. 1993), review granted, 886 P.2d 1311 (Cal. 1994), vacated and remanded, 904 P.2d 370
(Cal. 1995).
206. Interview with Alan Johnston, Partner, Duke, Gerstel, Shearer & Bregante, in San
Diego, Cal. (Sept. 1995).
207. Destructive testing is the phase of discovery wherein specific areas of a building or site
are systematically taken apart. This allows the parties to determine how the building was
actually built, what materials were used or left out, and what mistakes have been made.
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three different companies, A, B and C. A issued the developer three separate
policies for three successive years, each with a $100,000 limit. B provided
insurance for one year, but with a $400,000 limit. C came on the risk last,
with a one year policy with a $100,000 limit. The damages total $400,000.
If the "time on the risk" method is used, A (with three years on the risk)
would have to contribute $240,000. B and C (with one year on the risk)
would each have to pay $80,000. The inequities of this system are apparent
when one considers that B and C have the same liability, but B collected
much higher premiums for a larger policy.
If liability is allocated in proportion to the policy limits, the result is
much different. A and C would each owe $66,667, while B would owe
$266,667. This system is no fairer than the last. Why should A and C have
the same amount of liability when A was collecting premiums for three years,
and C was only on the risk for one?
The last method, which apportions liability according to a formula which
multiplies the policy limit by the time on the risk is the most equitable.
Using this method, A would be responsible for $150,000 ($300,000 of the
$800,000 total coverage over the period = 3/8), B for $200,000 ($400,000 of
the $800,000 total = 1/2), and C for $50,000 ($100,000 of the $800,000 total
= 1/8). It should be clear that this is by far the fairest method of allocation.
This method was first used by the court in Armstrong, who found that it
was not only the most equitable method, but also that it was consistent with
the policy language. °s If this formula is adopted in construction defect
cases, it would lend clarity and certainty to the situation, reduce the number
and length of lawsuits, and speed up settlements.
E. Other Issues to be Considered
All of the allocation methods mentioned above are far simpler than any
real life situation. In practice, most insurance policies include deductibles and
self-insured retentions (SIRs), which complicate the amount the carriers must
contribute. 0 9

208. Armstrong, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
[T]his court finds that the most equitable method of allocation is proration on the
basis of policy limits, multiplied by years of coverage. This method is consistent with
policy language in that it takes policy limits into consideration. Typically, a pro rata
'other insurance' clause provides for proration according to 'the applicable limit of
liability.' This method also reflects the fact that higher premiums are generally paid
for higher 'per person' or 'per occurrence' limits. Since some policies are in effect
for more than one year, and injury occurs every year ... , multiplying the policy
limits by years of coverage results in a more equitable allocation than proration based
on policy limits alone.
209. DiMugno, supra note 169, at 316.
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Developers also typically carry excess or umbrella policies for coverage
beyond what their primary policy will pay.2"0 Excess coverage does not
kick in until the underlying policy is exhausted.2 ' When multiple policies
are triggered, this leads to the question of whether there needs to be
horizontal or vertical exhaustion before various policies will be triggered. 2 '
Yet another factor which muddies the situation is the possibility that the
builder may have had no coverage for a period of time." 3 If there is a gap
in coverage, is the insured required to cover that period himself, or should the
other policies fill the gap, in accordance with the loss-in-progress rule?
Nearly all these scenarios will be involved with any large construction
defect claim. The combination of the various factors will greatly affect the
outcome of a particular case. The courts will have to decide each situation
on a case by case basis. This does not mean, however, that the courts should
abandon all attempts to set down guidelines for the key issues which always
arise. Practicing attorneys must have a starting point for knowing how to
proceed with continuous injury cases. The court, at a minimum, must
establish workable rules concerning defense, stacking, and basic allocation.
CONCLUSION

Montrose will have several effects on construction defect litigation. At
the outset, Montrose may increase overall litigation costs. Not all defects
encountered in a construction defect suit will fall into the "continuous injury"
category. Now experts must not only determine the cause and the extent of
damage, but must determine whether the damage was continuous. Costs will
also rise simply because there will be more insurance companies involved,
each arguing over the portion of the damage for which they should be held
liable.
Another reason litigation costs may increase is because Montrose does
not address many insurance issues which are essential to resolving construction defect disputes. While Montrose extends the potential for liability to
numerous carriers in construction defect cases, the opinion offers no guidance
as to how to handle the many implications which it precipitates. What are the
limits which a policyholder can collect? How should the indemnity be
allocated? What about excess coverage, SIR's, and gaps in coverage? Each
case will present very different combinations of types of policies, their
language, and exclusions. Until these questions are answered, construction
defect litigation will become mired in confusion, as attorneys spend time and
money arguing for one interpretation or another. If Montrose is to have any

210. Interview with Alan Johnston, Partner, Duke, Gerstel, Shearer & Bregante, in San
Diego, Cal. (Sept. 1995).
211. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684.
212. DiMugno, supra note 169, at 317.
213. Id.
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positive effect, the California Supreme Court must decide these outstanding
questions, and allow continuous injury cases to be resolved in an orderly
fashion.
Perhaps the most important issue which Montrose raises is the question
of stacking. If insureds can collect from all the triggered policies up to each
policy's limits, they will receive quite a windfall. In most situations, no
matter how extensive the damage, there will be coverage. Of course, this
would not be welcome news for the insurance industry, who would be faced
with far more liability than they had planned for. This, in turn, could result
in the insurance industry not issuing policies to developers for multi-unit
projects. If builders couldn't get insurance for their product, very few homes
would be built, and those that were built would be very expensive.
Following this scenario to its conclusion, the consumer would actually be
harmed, rather than benefitted, by opening up the limits of insurance
coverage.
The legal system should do what it can to encourage builders to build
quality homes. If the amount of coverage is limited, and the developer's own
resources are on the line in case of defective construction, reason dictates that
he will take greater care in building the home. This is not to say that the
homeowner would be guaranteed a top quality product, but he would get a
better built home than if the builder had unlimited indemnity. If stacking is
prohibited, there may not be a substantial improvement in home construction,
but at least the level of quality would be held to the status quo. If stacking
is allowed, and human nature being what it is, there would be little incentive
for a developer or contractor to take extra care-the insurance company
would pay for his mistakes.
Lynn Borkenhagen*

* B.A., Environmental Design, 1981, University of Pennsylvania; M.Arch. Architecture,
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